澳大利亚外长在中国世纪中的澳大利亚会议上的讲话（中英对照）

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中文版：http://pan.baidu.com/share/link?shareid=67447&uk=1711509989

 

Speech by Senator Bob Carr, Foreign Minister of Australia, to the “Australia in the China Century Conference”<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

澳大利亚外交部长鲍勃·卡尔在中国世纪中的澳大利亚会议上的讲话

 

14 September 2012

2012年9月14日

 

It’s 41 years, Mr. Chairman, since your father-in-law upstaged Henry Kissinger in Beijing.

 

主席先生，自你的岳父在北京领先基辛格一步，已经41年了。

 

On Monday July 5, 1971, Gough Whitlam had his historic meeting with Premier Zhou En Lai – a very public affair, in the great Hall of the People, from 9pm to midnight, before a large audience of Chinese officials and Australian journalists.

 

1971年7月5日星期一，高夫•惠特拉姆与周恩来总理在人民大会堂举行 了历史性的会见。这是一个非常公开的会见，从晚上9点一直持续到深夜，在场的有众多中国官员和澳大利亚记者。

 

Four days later, in deepest secrecy, Dr. Kissinger arrived in Beijing for his own talks with Premier Zhou. He rightly reported back to President Nixon: “Our announcement will shake the world.”

 

四天之后，在极度保密的情况下，基辛格博士到达北京与周恩来总理进行了谈话。他向尼克松总统报告时说：“我们的公告将会震动世界。”

 

Gough was, typically, more modest.

 

高夫一贯典型的更加谦逊。

 

When President Nixon revealed all, on world-wide television on July 15, the most he would claim was “at least it made Australia look less flatfooted, less imitative”.

 

当尼克松总统7月15日在面向全世界的电视上公布一切时，高夫所宣称最多就是“至少它让澳大利亚看上去不那么迟钝，不那么亦步亦趋”。

 

Mentioning these events of 41 years ago – perhaps the Chinese might say a mere 41 years ago – I don’t want to assert some kind of political ownership of Australia’s China Policy.

 

提起41年前的这些事情——中国人可能会说仅仅是41年以前——我并不想对澳大利亚的中国政策提出某种政治上的所有权。

 

Indeed, the continuity under successive governments, Labor and Liberal, underwrites its success.

 

当然，我们中国政策的成功依赖于工党和自由党相继政府坚持这一政策的连续性。

 

But I make two points:

 

但是我要提出两点：

 

The Whitlam visit of 1971 cleared the way for Australia’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China on the basis of the clear and firm undertakings spelt out on that night in the Great Hall of the People

 

惠特拉姆1971年的访问，特别是在人民大会堂那天晚上举行的清晰而坚定的活动，为澳大利亚承认中华人民共和国扫清了道路。

 

And second, the visit, and the interview with the Premier Zhou En Lai, expressed certain fundamentals about the relations between China and Australia which grow in relevance by the year.

 

其次，这次访问以及和周恩来总理的会谈，表达了中澳关系的一些基础。中澳关系也在这些基础上逐年发展。

 

The first of these fundamentals was, simply, facing the realities of China’s existence, its place in the region and the world as the home of a quarter of the world’s population and a unique civilisation.

 

第一个基础，很简单，就是面对现实，即中国的存在、其在本地区的地位、以及作为世界四分之一人口的家园和独特文明这些现实。

 

The second fundamental was that China could and should return to its rightful place as a constructive member of the international community.

 

第二个基础是，中国可以并应该作为国际社会的建设性一员回到它正确的位置。

 

The third fundamental was that China’s return would open immense opportunities – mutual opportunities – for the region, by no means limited to trade.

 

第三个基础是，中国返回世界将给本地区带来不仅仅局限于贸易的无限双向机遇。

 

In 2012, all this may sound trite.

 

在2012年，这些可能听上去都是老生常谈。

 

It certainly wasn’t 40 years ago.

 

但是40年前完全不是这样。

 

One of the great achievements of the Nixon-Kissinger initiative was to strip away the Cold War attitudes which saw China merely as an extension of a communist monolith from the Baltic Sea to the South China Sea.

 

尼克松—基辛格行动的最大成功之一就是摒弃了冷战思维，即：将中国仅仅视为从波罗的海至南中国海这个巨大的共产体系中的一个延伸。

 

The more powerful and decisive precisely because the initiative came from Richard Nixon, with peerless Cold War credentials.

 

他们的行动更加有力、更加具有决定性，正是因为这些行动来自于在冷战中具有无人匹及地位的理查德•尼克松。

 

Let me state a fourth fundamental which was clearly put forward by Whitlam in Beijing in July 1971.

 

让我再阐述一下惠特拉姆1971年7月在北京清晰表达的第四个基础。

 

It is the primary importance of our relationship with the United States and of a strong American presence in Asia and the Pacific.

 

那就是我们和美国的关系的重要性以及美国在亚太地区存在的重要性。

 

Remember that the United States and Australia were still in Vietnam.

 

要记住，那时候美国和澳大利亚还在越南战争中。

 

Australia had entered that war on the spurious argument advanced by Sir Robert Menzies that it was “part of the downward thrust of China between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans”.

 

由于罗伯特•孟席斯爵士提出来的具有欺骗性的观点“越南战争是中国在印度洋和太平洋之间的南侵”，澳大利亚加入了这场战争。

 

My party’s opposition to Australia’s involvement was based partly on the belief that defeat or humiliation would weaken, not strengthen, America’s position in the region.

 

工党对澳大利亚参战的反对部分是因为我们相信战胜或蒙羞都会削弱而不是加强美国在本地区的地位。

 

In Beijing in 1971, Premier Zhou did in fact – very skilfully and politely – invite Whitlam to repudiate the alliance by “suggesting that America would prove an unreliable ally” as the Soviet Union was proving an unreliable ally for China.

 

实际上1971年在北京周恩来总理确实非常有技巧和礼貌地建议惠特拉姆拒绝和美国联盟。他“暗示美国将被证实是一个不可靠的盟友”，就像苏联被证明不是中国的可靠盟友一样。

 

We sometimes hear echoes of this argument today from Chinese commentators.

 

我们今天有时还能听到中国评论家对这种论点的附和。

 

But note Whitlam’s immediate reply – and remember this was back in 1971 –

 

但是，注意惠特拉姆的立即回复——要记住这是在1971年：

 

“I must say with respect I see no parallel in the Sino-Soviet Pact and the ANZUS Treaty. There has been no similar deterioration between Australia and the United States as between China and the Soviet Union”.

 

“我必须怀着敬意地说，我认为《中苏友好同盟互助条约》和《澳美新条约》并没有可比性。澳大利亚和美国之间没有像中国和苏联之间相似的关系恶化”。

 

I mention this only to emphasise – as I have emphasised to Chinese interlocutors – that the Australia-US alliance is a very long-term, fundamental fact of life.

 

我提到这一点只是想强调——就向我对中方领导人所强调的一样——澳大利亚和美国的联盟是国家生活中长期的、根本的内容。

 

Those fundamentals must include a prospering and outward-looking China and a confident and forward-looking America.

 

这些基础必须包括一个繁荣的、外向的中国和一个自信的前瞻的美国。