中华人民共和国政府关于菲律宾共和国所提南海仲裁案管辖权问题的立场文件（中英对照）

45、菲律宾声称，1995年之后中菲两国就菲律宾仲裁请求中提及的事项多次交换意见，但未能解决争端；菲律宾有正当理由认为继续谈判已无意义，因而有权提起仲裁。事实上，迄今为止，中菲两国从未就菲律宾所提仲裁事项进行过谈判。

45. The Philippines claims that, the two countries have been involved in exchanges of views since 1995 with regard to the subject-matter of the Philippines’ claims for arbitration, without however reaching settlement, and that in its view, the Philippines is justified in believing that it is meaningless to continue the negotiations, and therefore the Philippines has the right to initiate arbitration. But the truth is that the two countries have never engaged in negotiations with regard to the subject-matter of the arbitration.

46、根据国际法，一般性的、不以争端解决为目的的交换意见不构成谈判。2011年国际法院在格鲁吉亚－俄罗斯联邦案的判决中表示，“谈判不仅是双方法律意见或利益的直接对抗，或一系列的指责和反驳，或对立主张的交换”，“谈判……至少要求争端一方有与对方讨论以期解决争端的真诚的努力”（判决第157段），且“谈判的实质问题必须与争端的实质问题相关，后者还必须与相关条约下的义务相关”（判决第161段）。

46. Under international law, general exchanges of views, without having the purpose of settling a given dispute, do not constitute negotiations. In Georgia v. Russian Federation, the ICJ held that, “Negotiations entail more than the plain opposition of legal views or interests between two parties, or the existence of a series of accusations and rebuttals, or even the exchange of claims and directly opposed counter-claims. As such, the concept of ‘negotiations’ … requires - at the very least - a genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing party, with a view to resolving the dispute” (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 132, para. 157). In addition, the ICJ considered that “the subject-matter of the negotiations must relate to the subject-matter of the dispute which, in turn, must concern the substantive obligations contained in the treaty in question” (Ibid., p. 133, para. 161).

47、南海问题涉及多个国家，其解决绝非易事。有关各方至今仍在为最终谈判解决南海问题创造条件。在此背景下，中菲之间就有关争端交换意见，主要是应对在争议地区出现的突发事件，围绕防止冲突、减少摩擦、稳定局势、促进合作的措施而进行的。即使按照菲律宾列举的证据，这些交换意见也远未构成谈判。

47. The South China Sea issue involves a number of countries, and it is no easy task to solve it. Up to the present, the countries concerned are still working together to create conditions conducive to its final settlement by negotiations. Against this background, the exchanges of views between China and the Philippines in relation to their disputes have so far pertained to responding to incidents at sea in the disputed areas and promoting measures to prevent conflicts, reduce frictions, maintain stability in the region, and promote measures of cooperation. They are far from constituting negotiations even on the evidence presented by the Philippines.

48、近年来，中国多次向菲律宾提出建立“中菲海上问题定期磋商机制”的建议，但一直未获菲律宾答复。2011年9月1日，双方发表《中华人民共和国和菲律宾共和国联合声明》，双方再次承诺通过谈判解决南海争端。然而未待谈判正式开始，菲律宾却于2012年4月10日动用军舰进入中国黄岩岛海域抓扣中国的渔船和渔民。对于菲律宾的挑衅性行动，中国被迫采取了维护主权的反制措施。此后，中国再次向菲律宾建议重启中菲建立信任措施磋商机制，仍未得到菲律宾回应。2012年4月26日，菲律宾外交部照会中国驻菲律宾大使馆，提出要将黄岩岛问题提交第三方司法机构，没有表达任何谈判的意愿。2013年1月22日，菲律宾即单方面提起了强制仲裁程序。

48. In recent years, China has on a number of occasions proposed to the Philippines the establishment of a China-Philippines regular consultation mechanism on maritime issues. To date, there has never been any response from the Philippines. On 1 September 2011, the two countries issued a Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Philippines, reiterating the commitment to settling their disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations. But, before negotiations could formally begin, the Philippines sent on 10 April 2012 a naval vessel to the waters of China’s Huangyan Dao to seize Chinese fishing boats together with the Chinese fishermen on board. In the face of such provocations, China was forced to take response measures to safeguard its sovereignty. Thereafter, China once again proposed to the Philippine Government that the two sides restart the China-Philippines consultation mechanism for confidence-building measures. That proposal again fell on deaf ears. On 26 April 2012, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs delivered a note verbale to the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines, proposing that the issue of Huangyan Dao be referred to a third-party adjudication body for resolution and indicating no willingness to negotiate. On 22 January 2013, the Philippines unilaterally initiated the present compulsory arbitration proceedings.

49、中菲此前围绕南海问题所进行的交换意见，也并非针对菲律宾所提的仲裁事项。例如，菲律宾援引1997年5月22日中国外交部关于黄岩岛问题的声明，以证明中菲之间就黄岩岛的海洋权利问题存在争端并已交换意见；但菲律宾故意没有援引的是，中国外交部在声明中明确指出：“黄岩岛的问题是领土主权问题，专属经济区的开发和利用是海洋管辖权问题，两者的性质和所适用的法律规则都截然不同，不能混为一谈。菲方试图以海洋管辖权侵犯中国领土主权的企图是完全站不住脚的。”这一声明的含义是，菲律宾不得借口黄岩岛位于其主张的专属经济区范围内，否定中国对该岛的领土主权。可见，上述交换意见的核心是主权问题。

49. The previous exchanges of views regarding the South China Sea issue between the two countries did not concern the subject-matter of the Philippines’ claims for arbitration. For instance, the Philippines cited a statement released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 22 May 1997 regarding Huangyan Dao, in order to show that there exists between the two countries a dispute concerning the maritime rights of Huangyan Dao and that the two countries had exchanged views with regard to that dispute. However, the Philippines deliberately omitted a passage from that statement, which reads: “The issue of Huangyandao is an issue of territorial sovereignty; the development and exploitation of the EEZ is a question of maritime jurisdiction, the nature of the two issues are different and hence the laws and regulations governing them are also different, and they should not be discussed together. The attempt of the Philippine side to use maritime jurisdictional rights to violate the territorial sovereignty of China is untenable.” This passage makes clear the thrust of the statement: the Philippines shall not negate China’s sovereignty over Huangyan Dao on the pretext that it is situated within the EEZ of the Philippines. This shows that the exchange of views in question was centred on the issue of sovereignty.

50、还需注意的是，菲律宾试图说明中菲两国自1995年起交换意见的事项是关于《公约》解释或适用的问题，但这是不符合事实的。历史上，菲律宾于1961年6月17日颁布第3046号共和国法案，将位于菲律宾群岛最外缘各岛以外、由1898年美西《巴黎条约》等国际条约所确定的菲律宾边界线以内的广阔水域纳入菲律宾领海，领海的宽度大大超过12海里。菲律宾于1978年6月11日颁布第1596号总统令，对所谓“卡拉延岛群”（即中国南沙群岛部分岛礁）及其周边大范围的海域、海床、底土、大陆边及其上空主张主权。菲律宾自己也承认，直到2009年3月10日通过的第9522号共和国法令，菲律宾才开始使其国内法与《公约》相协调，以期完全放弃与《公约》不符的海洋权利主张。该法令首次规定，“卡拉延岛群”（即中国南沙群岛部分岛礁）和“斯卡伯勒礁”（即中国黄岩岛）的海洋区域将与《公约》第一百二十一条（即“岛屿制度”）保持一致。既然菲律宾自己都认为，其直到2009年才开始放弃以往与《公约》不符的海洋权利主张，那么何谈中菲两国自1995年起已就与本仲裁案有关的《公约》解释或适用的问题交换意见。

50. It should be further noted that, the Philippines has attempted to show that the subject-matter of the exchanges of views between China and the Philippines since 1995 concerns the interpretation or application of the Convention, but nothing could be farther from the truth than this. Historically, the Philippines, by Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961, proclaimed as part of its territorial sea the vast areas of sea between the most outlying islands in the Philippine archipelago and the treaty limits established in the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain in 1898, among other international treaties, thus claiming a belt of territorial sea far beyond 12 nautical miles. By Presidential Decree No. 1596 promulgated on 11 June 1978, the Philippines made its claim for sovereignty over the so-called “Kalayaan Island Group” (i.e., some maritime features of China’s Nansha Islands), together with the adjacent but vast areas of waters, sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin, and superjacent airspace. As conceded by the Philippines itself, only with the adoption on 10 March 2009 of Republic Act No. 9522 did it begin the ongoing process to harmonize its domestic law with the Convention, with a view to eventually relinquishing all its maritime claims incompatible with the Convention. That Act provided, for the first time, that the maritime areas of the so-called “Kalayaan Island Group” (i.e., some maritime features of China’s Nansha Islands) and “Scarborough Shoal” (i.e., China’s Huangyan Dao) “shall be determined” so as to be “consistent with Article 121” of the Convention (i.e., the regime of islands). Therefore, given that the Philippines itself considers that only in 2009 did it start to abandon its former maritime claims in conflict with the Convention, how could it have started in 1995 to exchange views with China on matters concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention that are related to the present arbitration?

51、菲律宾声称，由于中国自己已严重违反了《宣言》的规定，所以无权援引《宣言》第四条来排除仲裁庭对本案的管辖权。上述说法严重违背事实。菲律宾指责中国采取包括威胁使用武力的行动驱离在黄岩岛海域长期、持续作业的菲律宾渔民，以及中国阻止菲律宾对在仁爱礁坐滩的军舰和人员进行补给，试图说明中国违反了《宣言》的规定。但事实是，在黄岩岛问题上，菲律宾首先采取威胁使用武力的手段，于2012年4月10日非法派出军舰在黄岩岛海域强行扣留、逮捕中国渔船和渔民。在仁爱礁问题上，菲律宾一艘军舰于1999年5月以所谓“技术故障”为借口，在中国南沙群岛的仁爱礁非法坐滩。中国多次向菲律宾提出交涉，要求菲律宾立即拖走该舰。菲律宾也曾多次向中国明确承诺拖走因“技术故障”坐滩的军舰。然而15年来，菲律宾不仅违背此前承诺，拒不拖走有关军舰，反而试图在该礁上修建固定设施。2014年3月14日，菲律宾还公开宣称其在1999年是将该军舰作为永久设施部署在仁爱礁。针对菲律宾的上述挑衅行为，中国被迫采取了必要的措施。因此，菲律宾对中国的指责是毫无道理的。

51. The Philippines claims that China cannot invoke Paragraph 4 of the DOC to exclude the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, given its own grave breach of the terms of the DOC. This is groundless. In support of its allegations against China, the Philippines claims that China has taken measures including the threat of force to drive away Philippine fishermen from the waters of Huangyan Dao in spite of their long-standing and continuous fishing activities in those waters, and that China has blocked the Philippines from resupplying a naval ship which ran and has stayed aground at Ren’ai Jiao and certain navy personnel on board. But the fact is that, regarding the situation at Huangyan Dao, it was the Philippines that first resorted to the threat of force by dispatching on 10 April 2012 a naval vessel to detain and arrest Chinese fishing boats and fishermen in the waters of Huangyan Dao. Regarding the situation at Ren’ai Jiao, which is a constituent part of China’s Nansha Islands, the Philippines illegally ran a naval ship aground in May 1999 at that feature on the pretext of “technical difficulties”. China has made repeated representations to the Philippines, demanding that the latter immediately tow away the vessel. The Philippines, for its part, had on numerous occasions made explicit undertaking to China to tow away the vessel grounded due to “technical difficulties”. However, for over 15 years, instead of fulfilling that undertaking, the Philippines has attempted to construct permanent installations on Ren’ai Jiao. On 14 March 2014, the Philippines even openly declared that the vessel was deployed as a permanent installation on Ren’ai Jiao in 1999. China has been forced to take necessary measures in response to such provocative conduct. In light of these facts, the Philippines’ accusations against China are baseless.

52、菲律宾一方面为支持其提起的仲裁而否认《宣言》第四条的效力，另一方面，却又在2014年8月1日外交部声明中提出解决南海问题的倡议，要求各方遵守《宣言》第五条的规定，并且“全面、有效执行《宣言》”。菲律宾对《宣言》所采取的这种自相矛盾、出尔反尔的做法，明显违反国际法上的诚信原则。

52. While it denies the effect of Paragraph 4 of the DOC for the purpose of supporting its institution of the present arbitration, the Philippines recently called on the parties to the DOC to comply with Paragraph 5 of the DOC and to provide “the full and effective implementation of the DOC”, in a proposal made in its Department of Foreign Affairs statement dated 1 August 2014. This selective and self-contradictory tactic clearly violates the principle of good faith in international law.

53、诚信原则要求各国对相互达成的协议作出诚实的解释，不得为了获取不正当的利益，而对协议作出违反原意的曲解。诚信原则至关重要，它体现在《联合国宪章》第二条第二款中，涉及国际法的各个方面（参见罗伯特·詹宁斯和亚瑟·瓦茨1992年所编《奥本海国际法》第9版第一卷第38页）。国际法院在1974年澳大利亚－法国核试验案的判决中指出，“指导制订和履行国际义务的基本原则之一就是诚信原则，无论这种义务是基于什么渊源，信任与信心是国际合作的根本”（判决第46段）。

53. The principle of good faith requires all States to honestly interpret agreements they enter into with others, not to misinterpret them in disregard of their authentic meaning in order to obtain an unfair advantage. This principle is of overriding importance and is incorporated in Article 2 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations. It touches every aspect of international law (Cf. Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., 1992, vol. 1, p. 38). In the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that, “One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation” (Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 268, para. 46).

54、中国愿借此机会强调，《宣言》是中国与东盟国家经过多年耐心的谈判，在相互尊重、互谅互让的基础上达成的重要文件。在《宣言》中，有关各方承诺由直接有关的主权国家通过友好磋商和谈判解决它们的领土和管辖权争议；各方重申以《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则、1982年《公约》、《东南亚友好合作条约》、和平共处五项原则以及其它公认的国际法原则作为处理国家间关系的基本准则；各方承诺根据上述原则，在平等和相互尊重的基础上，探讨建立信任的途径；各方重申尊重并承诺包括1982年《公约》在内的公认的国际法原则所规定的在南海的航行及飞越自由；各方承诺保持自我克制，不采取使争议复杂化、扩大化和影响和平与稳定的行动，包括不在现无人居住的岛、礁、滩、沙或其他自然构造上采取居住的行动，并以建设性的方式处理它们的分歧。此外，《宣言》还详细列出有关各方在和平解决它们的领土和管辖权争议之前，建立相互信任的途径和开展合作的领域。作为落实《宣言》的后续行动，各方承诺将磋商制定“南海行为准则”。

54. On this occasion, China wishes to emphasize that the DOC is an important instrument, adopted by China and the ASEAN member States following many years of arduous negotiations on the basis of mutual respect, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Under the DOC, the parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned. In addition, the parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 Convention, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations. The Parties commit themselves to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual respect; reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in, and overflight above, the South China Sea as provided for by universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 Convention; and undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features, and to handle their differences in a constructive manner. The DOC also lists a number of ways to build trust and areas of cooperation for the Parties concerned to seek and explore pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes. As a follow-up to the DOC, the parties have undertaken to negotiate a “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea”.

55、《宣言》对稳定南海局势、促进中国与东盟国家的海上合作和增信释疑起到了积极作用。《宣言》每项条款均构成该文件不可分割的组成部分。否定《宣言》的作用，将导致中国和东盟国家南海合作关系的严重倒退。

55. The DOC has played a positive role in maintaining stability in the South China Sea, and in enhancing maritime cooperation, building trust and reducing misgivings between China and the ASEAN member States. Every provision of the DOC constitutes an integral part of the document. To deny the significance of the DOC will lead to a serious retrogression from the current relationship of cooperation between China and the ASEAN member States in the South China Sea.

56、菲律宾作为东盟成员，参与了《宣言》的整个磋商过程，应当十分清楚《宣言》对通过谈判和平解决南海问题的重要性。目前，中国和包括菲律宾在内的东盟国家已建立工作机制积极落实《宣言》，并就“南海行为准则”展开磋商，维护南海局势的稳定，为南海问题的最终和平解决创造条件。菲律宾现在提起强制仲裁程序，与中国和东盟国家的共同愿望和努力背道而驰，其目的并非像菲律宾所标榜的那样寻求和平解决南海问题，而是试图通过仲裁向中国施加政治压力，以通过对《公约》的所谓“解释或适用”来达到否定中国在南海的合法权利，并按其单方面主张和意愿解决南海问题的目的。对此，中国当然不能接受。

56. As a member of the ASEAN and having been involved throughout the consultations on the DOC, the Philippines should have fully appreciated the significance of the DOC for the peaceful settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations. At present, in order to maintain stability in the region and create conditions for peaceful settlement of the South China Sea issue, China and the ASEAN member States have established working mechanisms to effectively implement the DOC, and have been engaged in consultations regarding the “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea”. By initiating compulsory arbitration at this juncture, the Philippines is running counter to the common wish and joint efforts of China and the ASEAN member States. Its underlying goal is not, as the Philippines has proclaimed, to seek peaceful resolution of the South China Sea issue, but rather, by resorting to arbitration, to put political pressure on China, so as to deny China’s lawful rights in the South China Sea through the so-called “interpretation or application” of the Convention, and to pursue a resolution of the South China Sea issue on its own terms. This is certainly unacceptable to China.